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Executive Summary 
 
 There has long been concern regarding the implications of state and local fiscal policy on 
the location decisions of firms and individuals.  Many researchers have attempted to answer the 
question, “Do higher taxes repel economic development as measured through the migration of 
firms and individuals?”  Unfortunately, there have been few consistent findings.  Researchers who 
study the impacts of fiscal incentives on firm location and employment find that rarely does any 
one fiscal incentive impact business decisions, but rather what matters is the entire package of 
existing public services and taxes in addition to new incentives. 
 Less research has focused on how individual’s migration behavior is affected by taxes.  
This is an important issue for many state and local governments, and Georgia is no exception.  
Over the last ten years, the state has significantly increased the tax preferences for the elderly 
resident population of the state.  Retirees can exclude up to $14,000 of income per tax filer and in 
addition can exclude all social security income from state income tax.  Many local jurisdictions 
give property tax reductions to elderly residents for at least a portion of property taxes.  Have these 
tax abatements affected the level of migration of the elderly to the state?  At the same time, 
Georgia’s personal income tax is a relatively flat tax, with a top tax rate that is similar to that found 
in many other states.  If the state reduced its income tax rate, would working individuals move to 
Georgia to take advantage of the lower tax rate?  If the state increased the tax rate, would 
individuals leave the state to work elsewhere?  These are largely unanswered questions.  
 This research paper addresses the issue of whether state income tax treatment affects the 
location decision of individuals.  There have been some estimates of the effects of tax differences 
on the migration patterns of individuals, but this is a hard issue to research.  Data are often not 
available and it is very difficult to compute all of the taxes faced by individuals.  Also, taxes are 
not the only thing that influences people’s decisions of where to live.  Other amenities are 
important, including public services, weather, proximity to family, and employment opportunities.  
In fact, individuals may be compensated for higher taxes by these other amenities.  For example, a 
high taxing state might have a terrific system of public education, which individuals are willing to 
support via higher taxes.  Higher wages may be offered to compensate for higher taxes.  Unless we 
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try to separate these different influences, it will be very difficult to offer policy advice regarding 
whether or not individual’s migration patterns are affected by taxes. 
 This paper considers only one specific tax–the state individual income tax–and attempts to 
determine whether the tax itself affects state-to-state migration behavior.  Using data on migration 
of individuals over a five-year period, we analyze whether the income tax directly influences the 
migration decision.  Many studies find little evidence to support a big influence of individual taxes 
on migration.  Part of this may be that, if individuals are compensated for taxes via other amenities, 
the effect of taxes themselves simply do not show up in the analysis.  In our research we find that 
in certain areas of the country, higher wages in part compensate individuals for higher income 
taxes.  This could explain why in most studies, taxes rarely have a big effect on migration.  
Interestingly, in the Southeast region, wages do not seem to compensate for income taxes.  This 
could be due to the fact that in the Southeast, the package of individual taxes (including the income 
tax) are more similar across states than in regions such as the Northeast.  This should not be taken 
to suggest that state income taxes have no impact on migration in the Southeast, but rather, that we 
should take a better look at other taxes such as property and sales taxes.  Also, since much of the 
policy activity around state income taxes in Georgia and other states is targeted at the elderly, it 
would be very useful to study migration patterns of the elderly more specifically.  Such a study 
would require more specific data. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Over the past several decades there has been a significant amount of literature which 
examines the determinants of  human migration.  Much of the empirical literature of the last three 
decades has its roots with the investment model of migration developed by Sjaastad (1962).  In this 
model, potential migrants choose to move if the utility derived from a move exceeds the utility 
derived at the individual’s origin location.  A move is seen as an investment which increases total 
life-time utility.  What has lead to much of the empirical literature since the 1980s is the  
relationship between amenities of the origins and destinations and net lifetime income.   
 As summarized by Graves (1980), the migration literature falls into two camps with respect 
to Sjaastad’s original investment model of migration.  In one case, migration occurs because of real 
and changing differences in the utility associated with specific amenities.  In this world, 
capitalization of amenity differences is not complete so that real differences in income 
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opportunities exist among jurisdictions.  Another view of the migration process is that amenity 
differences (broadly defined) are captured in wage and rent differentials.  In an equilibrium world, 
there would be no migration at the margin as amenity differences are fully reflected (capitalized) 
into wages and rents.  In this view of the migration decision, migration occurs due to the movement 
from an equilibrium situation in response to a new set of preferences--people move because their 
tastes and preferences change, which alters relative prices and real incomes.1 Empirical findings to 
date have shown some support for both models (Borjas, Bronars and Trejo 1992; Clark and Hunter 
1992; and Greenwood’s 1985 survey). 
 In either general model of migration, the potential of capitalization (full or in part) of 
amenities (physical and other) into income has significant consequences for the estimated impacts 
of these amenities on the migration decision.  In the empirical examination of the effect of fiscal 
variables on the migration decision, the capitalization hypothesis has been downplayed. In fact, 
there has been relatively little empirical research devoted to the impact of tax variables on the 
individual migration decision (exceptions include Fox, Herzog, and Schlottman, 1989;  see also a 
survey found in Cebula, 1979).2  In cases in which taxes are considered, there has been no test of 
the capitalization hypothesis although there is some evidence that at least for state personal income 
taxes,  capitalization exists and is a function of some distinct personal characteristics related to job 
skill as well as industry (Wallace, 1993).  
 This paper seeks to fill two gaps in the migration literature.  First, the migration decision 
studied here is the state-to-state migration decision and the effect of the state personal income tax 
on this decision is highlighted.  The limited evidence on the effect of fiscal variables on migration 
suggests that taxes may have some impact on at least part of the migration decision (leaving) at a 
local level (Fox, et al. 1989), but there is almost no evidence on the impact of state-level taxes on 
individual migration.  There are a few important state level taxes, primarily the income and sales 
taxes.  In most states, the income tax is a matter of state policy only, while the sales tax is a 
function of both state and local policy.  State income tax revenues account for approximately 34 
percent of total state revenues, and the frequency with which state policy makers tinker with state 
 
1 This dichotomy in the literature is discussed in many other papers including Knapp and 
Graves (1989), Greenwood and Hunt (1989), and Clark and Hunter (1992), among others.  
Some of these authors present slight alternatives to the dichotomy presented here. 
2 There is a more expansive literature on the impacts of tax related variables on the economic 
development, measured via employment and firm location (Wasylenko and McGuire, 1985). 
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income tax systems suggest that state income tax rates are important to the population.  The second 
addition of this paper is that the migration decision is estimated using micro-level data that 
specifically account for the potential of tax capitalization.3  The importance of the tax variable on 
the migration decision is directly estimated by comparing tax burdens associated with the income 
tax at the origin and potential destination locations.  This approach allows us to examine how 
important relative taxes are in the move decision, rather than the typical approach of estimating the 
importance of  fiscal  and  other  variables  at  the origin or the destination.  Also, by estimating 
state income taxes based on potential wages for individual observations, we eliminate the problem 
of using average tax rates for the income tax.  
 
II. Background 
 
 There is a wide variety of migration literature that examines the reasons for moving.  In 
most cases, the models are derived from the household utility maximization problem which was 
posited in a migration framework by Hicks (1932), Todaro (1969), and Sjaastad (1962).  The 
limitations of aggregate approaches to studying the effects of fiscal and other variables are 
obvious--the aggregate data and measures of tax burdens mask the true effect of differences in 
fiscal variables among individuals on the migration decision.   
 The theoretical  basis of the basic migration model used here is the classic utility 
maximization model of consumer behavior.  The potential migrant is viewed as a neo-classical 
consumer, concerned with maximizing utility given a  number of different location opportunities. 
Utility is a function of the  consumption of private and public goods and amenities of each location.  
Utility at the origin defines the level of utility that an alternative location must exceed to make the 
household migrate.  The potential migrant household maximizes utility at the origin subject to their 
budget constraint to yield their indirect utility function: 
 
   Vo = f (Io (Xo), Ao / Z)      (1) 
 
where I  = real income weighted by the probability of obtaining employment 
          A = location specific goods and amenities not affecting real income 
 
3 State income, average property and average sales taxes are included. 
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          X = location specific amenities affecting real income 
          Z = individual characteristics 
 Location specific amenities include taxes, weather, public expenditures, etc.  The indirect 
utility function at any potential location, j, (other than the origin) can be expressed in a similar 
manner: 
 
  V j  = f (Ij (X j), Aj  / Z) for all j … o                       (2) 
The probability of obtaining employment is assumed to be one at the origin if the individual is 
employed. 
 
 If the value of the indirect utility function at any non-origin location is greater than that at 
the origin, the household will choose to move (Y=1).  This can be represented by the following 
probability: 
 
 P (Y=1) = Prob ( Vj > V o ) for any j … o    (3) 
 
The differences in income and amenities between the origin and all possible destinations thereby 
define the likelihood that a potential migrant will actually move.   
 While we usually think of wage differences as the major reason for differences in utility at 
various locations, the utility may be different for a variety of reasons.  People may move because 
their preference for amenities change (weather or education for example); or destinations may 
become “better” (schools in a state face reduced funding and decline in quality).4  In this case, the 
change in the family's demand for an amenity, and not wage differentials, may be the driving force 
in migration.  Another model of migration is the more traditional disequilibrium model which 
views migration as a means to eliminate differentials in real earnings (Sjaastad 1962, and 
Greenwood and Hunt 1989).   In this case, real income differentials exist and families move to 
increase their earning potential.   
 
4 This equilibrium hypothesis was proposed by Graves and Linneman (1979) and used by 
Graves (1980) and others in their studies of migration.  This hypothesis holds that amenity 
differentials (including fiscal amenities) are capitalized into wages and rents such that pure 
wage gains cannot be made by moving unless there is a change in the demand for non-traded 
amenities. 
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 It is important to note that even in the disequilibrium case, wage differentials may be 
compensating in part because amenities are partially capitalized in wages.5  Even given this 
complication, why doesn't everyone move to the same place or just stay put?  Obviously, families 
have different preferences for amenities which leds them to different locations, moving costs can 
be prohibitive to some destinations, average capitalization yields different wages for different 
individuals, and the probability of finding employment is not the same for everyone.  There is some 
empirical evidence that wage differentials are in part affected by differentials in living conditions, 
climate, crime rates, and taxes, among others.  Henderson (1982) specifically sought to estimate the 
value of amenities that is reflected in wage differentials.  He found that crime (murder rate in the 
SMSA) and weather were significant amenity determinants of wage differentials.6   While amenity 
capitalization is not the central theme of Price and Mills (1985), they also find that amenities such 
as crime and weather influence wage differentials. 
 In all likelihood, migration is due to both amenities and job-related factors as well as 
subjective judgements of the potential migrants about the risk of a move.  Although compensating 
wage differentials exist, they may not fully compensate individuals for differentials due to 
differences in tastes among the population, a lack of information, wage rigidity, and the like.  What 
is important is that there is likely to be some capitalization of amenities including taxes into wages, 
so that real income gains from moving may not be as large as nominal income differentials suggest.  
This is particularly true for state income taxes, which have largely been found to have little impact 
on migration in previous studies.  The interpretation of these determinants in previous studies may 
be incorrect due to capitalization and this is a central point in this paper. 
 A wide variety of migration determinants have been analyzed in the migration literature.  
Recent migration studies have begun to focus on environmental effects and fiscal effects of 
migration versus the more traditional weather, crime amenities and pure economic factors.  
Schacter and Althaus (1989) specifically test an equilibrium model of aggregate net migration and 
find that average state and local taxes negatively influence in-migration and positively affect out-
migration.  They do not find a significant relationship between migration and public services.  Fox, 
Herzog and Schlottman (1989) test a micro-level model of metropolitan migration using a binary 
 
5 Amenities include government services, taxes, and population characteristics. 
6 Henderson also lists amenity variables that he rejected based on insignificant or perverse 
results.  These included:  percent of the population below the poverty line, percent of the 
population black, annual precipitation, pollution measures, and state part and water resources. 
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logit specification.  Using Census micro-data, they find that average income and sales tax rates (tax 
revenue divided by personal income) in the individual's place of residence are not significant 
predictors of the general “move” decision, however, they find that expenditures are a much more 
important determinant of metro migration and property taxes encouraged individuals to leave a 
metro area while income taxes discourage entering a metro area. 
 Mueller's work (1982) provides a comprehensive analysis of the migration choice of 
households, but does not consider the impact of fiscal variables.  By examining all of the 
determinants to date in one migration model, Clark and Hunter (1992) are able to compare the 
relative effect of economic opportunity, amenities and fiscal variables on migration.  They use 
aggregate net migration figures by age group and find that income and death taxes do affect net 
migration of certain age groups.  Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) use a micro-sample from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of young men and test for the effects of different returns to skill 
levels across the country.  They find that returns do differ across the country and these differences 
encourage migration to alternative locations.  They do not however, control for fiscal effects. 
 A summary of the literature on individual migration in the U.S. demonstrates that empirical 
techniques have become more sophisticated and the use of individual-specific characteristics to 
describe migration has increased.  However, there has been little advancement in the use of 
individual-specific tax variables in any context, and especially in a fully specified migration model 
which considers the effects of various alternatives on the migration choice.  Part of the reason for 
this is that it is difficult to measure the difference in taxes paid by any one individual in two 
different locations.  In this paper, state and federal individual income taxes are calculated for each 
sample observation for the origin state and all alternatives, which adds to the richness of the fiscal 
variables.7 This is done using a state-level computer simulation model of state personal income 
taxes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Federal income taxes were also calculated due to the deductibility of these taxes in some 
states. 
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III. Empirical Model 
 
 Recalling the probability model from equation (3), we can express the probability of a 
move (Y=1) for each n individuals as:8 
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Equation (4) says that for each individual, the probability of a move is a function of the income 
differential (I) between each potential state j and the home state o (and the income differential is a 
function of various amenity and labor market characteristics, X, which are capitalized into wages), 
non-capitalized amenity differentials, A, and personal characteristics and transportation costs 
which affect the general propensity to move (Z, of which there are m).  
 As previously noted, many authors have found support for at least partial capitalization of 
various amenities into income differentials (Graves and Linneman 1979).  The main addition in 
this paper is a test of the application of the capitalization of the state personal income tax and the 
impact on state-to-state migration.  The state personal income tax is arguably one of the most 
 
 
where the amenity differential (X i  - X j) in this case refers to amenities that are capitalized into 
income differentials and V is a vector of characteristics which may affect the level of capitalization 
(including industry and job-specific characteristics).  The dependent variable, the income 
 
8 This formulation is derived assuming that the error terms are normally distributed and their 
difference is distributed normally with a mean of zero and  variance of  σ2 so that the 
probability model is the usual probit model (individual subscripts eliminated).  
important taxes at the state level.  Wallace (1993) finds that state income taxes are capitalized into 
wages for certain types of jobs in certain types of industries.9  The results from the literature are 
used here to develop the empirical specification of the income differential equation.  The structural 
equation for the income differential is: 
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differential between origin and potential destination, is calculated as the average wage for each 
potential migrant in the home and destination state.  Equation (5) is estimated first to obtain a 
predicted value of the income differential and the predicted value is used in the probit model of 
equation (4) to determine the probability of a move.  
 
IV. Data and Variable Construction 
 
 The migration sample was constructed from the 1990 Current Population Survey, Annual 
Demographic File (CPS) by taking the highest income earner for each family reporting wage and  
salary income for 1989.10  The highest income earner was chosen on the assumption that if the 
migration decision is affected by income, it is affected more by the highest income in the family 
than by other incomes in the household.  The data for the individual also contain pertinent 
household characteristics such as family size, age of household head, etc. 
 To determine the choice set facing the potential migrant, one might wish to consider all 
states as alternatives.  Although this has merit in a theoretical sense, few if any potential migrants 
really consider all states in a migration choice.11   The fact is that for any one origin, a few states 
are much more likely to be chosen than other states.   The choice set was therefore constructed as 
follows.  By region, we tabulated the destination states for all individuals who migrated between 
states from 1989 to 1990.  For example, for individuals living in the Northeast region in 1989 and 
moving by 1990, the most popular destinations were New York, New Jersey, and Florida. These 
most popular destinations were then considered the choice set for all potential migrants from the 
Northeast  region.12  All of the regression estimates are made using individual observations by 
region due to the asymmetric nature of the choice sets.  
 For the income differential equation (equation (5)), we constructed a wage differential 
which is the difference in the average wage by industry and occupation in the origin and each 
destination state.  Each individual in the sample is therefore assigned the nominal wage in their 
 
10 The CPS contains information on state of residence in year t and year t-1. 
11 See Mueller (1982). 
12 The resulting choice sets are as follows for each origin region: 
Northeast: New York, New Jersey and Florida; Southeast: D.C., North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Florida; West: Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, and Alaska; Midwest: Ohio, 
Illinois, Michigan, and Florida. 
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origin state and the nominal wage in their potential destination states, based on industry and 
occupation. The OLS regressions are then run by region for each origin-destination choice 
separately.  For example, for individuals in the sample who originally reside in the Northeast 
region, we assign them the average wage for their industry and occupation for their home state as 
well as that for New York, New Jersey, and Florida. For this subset (Northeast region origin), we 
run a regression of the wage differential in the home state and New York to determine the 
predicted differential.  We do the same for New Jersey and Florida, and then repeat the process for 
the three other regions.  We employ this estimate of wage differential as we assume that 
individuals will respond to expected real differences in their income which are reflective of the 
“going wage” in the states.  The predicted wage differentials will reflect the capitalization of the 
relative amenities in the origin and destination states.  While the actual wage that the individuals 
receive in the origin and destination states could be higher or lower, this will be controlled for in 
the actual migration equation. Also, this technique allows us to impute destination wages to 
individuals who do not decide to move. 
 The specific independent variables in the wage differential equation are guided by the 
wealth of previous research and include differences in labor market characteristics (EMPGRO-
growth in employment by industry), differences in fiscal amenities (SMTAX--state effective 
marginal income tax rate, PTAX--average property tax rate, SALTAX--average sales tax rate, 
EXPEDPC--per capita expenditures on education, EXPWELPC--per capita expenditures on 
welfare), differences in non-fiscal amenities (DDAYS--degree days number of days the 
temperature is above 65 degrees, MHOUSE-median house value), differences in average human 
capital (ED--percent of population enrolled in high school), and dummy variables to control for 
differences in the returns to various occupations and industries (OCi and INDi).13  A summary of 
the variables included in both equations is given in Table 1. 
 The sales (SALTAX) and property tax (PTAX) variables are average effective rates:   state  
and  local  sales  tax  revenue  divided by personal income and property tax 
 
13 The dummy variables for occupation are: OC1 = executive, professional, OC2= technicians, 
sales, administrative support, OC3=Service (all others are the omitted category); for industry: 
IND1 = Manufacturing, IND2= Wholesale and retail trade, IND3=Finance, insurance, real 
estate, IND4=Personal services (all others are the omitted category). 
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TABLE 1.  VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Variable 
Name 
Description Source 
SMTAX 
 
EMPGRO 
 
EXPED 
 
EXPWEL 
 
PTAX 
 
 
SALTAX 
 
DDAYS 
 
ED 
 
MHOUSE 
INDi 
OCi 
AGE 
TENURE 
KIDS 
MARS 
SPWORK 
 
WAGEiH 
 
EMPi 
 
WDIF 
Difference in effective state personal 
income tax rate 
Difference in growth in employment 
(by relevant industry) 
Difference in per capita expenditures 
on education 
Difference in per capita welfare 
expenditures  
 
Difference in average property tax 
rate as a function of personal income 
 
Difference in average sales tax rate as 
a function of personal income 
Number of days with temperature 
above 65 degrees (difference between 
states) 
Difference in the percent of 
population enrolled in high school 
Difference in median house value 
Industry dummy variable 
Occupation dummy variable 
Age of primary earner 
Housing tenure (=1 if owner, =0 
otherwise) 
Number of children 
Marital status (=1 if married, =0 
otherwise) 
Dummy variable for employed spouse 
(=1 if employed, =0 otherwise) 
Predicted wage differential for 
potential destination state i 
Difference in industry employment 
concentration  
Difference between an individual’s 
wage and the average for that 
individual’s occupation and industry 
in the origin state 
Calculation of CPS 
data 
 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Census of 
Governments 
 
Census of 
Governments 
 
Advisory 
Commission on 
Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations 
(ACIR) 
ACIR 
 
Statistical Abstract 
 
Statistical Abstract 
 
Statistical Abstract 
CPS 
CPS 
CPS 
CPS 
CPS 
CPS 
CPS 
 
Estimated 
 
BEA 
 
Computed from CPS 
 
revenues divided by personal income.  State effective marginal income tax rates (SMTAX) were 
calculated using a microsimulation model of state and federal taxes.  The effective marginal tax 
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rates were calculated by increasing adjusted gross income reported by the individuals in the CPS 
by $100 and recalculating tax payments.  Using these calculated effective marginal tax rates, a file 
of average state effective marginal tax rates by state, industry, and occupation was created.  This 
file contains approximately 2,500 effective state marginal tax rates (50 state * 10 industries * 5 
occupations).  Each observation was assigned the state effective marginal tax rate for their industry 
and occupation in their home state and all potential destinations.  
 The tax variables may be capitalized into wages such that states with higher effective 
income, property and sales tax rates may have higher nominal wages.  If no capitalization were 
present, then the tax rate differentials would be uncorrelated with wage differentials and we would 
therefore expect migration decisions to be influenced directly by tax differentials.  Our expectation 
is that income taxes are more likely to be capitalized than the less individual specific sales and 
property taxes. 
 The expenditure amenities are expected to influence wage differentials if they are valued in 
a consistent way among residents in a state.  For example, education is usually valued in a positive 
way.  If this were true, we would expect wages to be lower in states that support higher overall 
spending in education.  The sign on the welfare expenditure category may be less clear-cut.  On the 
one hand, if welfare is perceived as a good aimed at redistribution and this redistribution is valued, 
residents may take somewhat of a wage cut to support this activity.  On the other hand, residents 
may want to be compensated through higher wages to support the poor or anything that lowers 
their after tax income. 
 Using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, EMPGRO is calculated as the 
difference in the growth in employment in industry k in the origin state o from 1985 to 1989 and 
the same growth in potential destination state j: 
 ((EMP 89ok  - EMP 85ok)/ EMP 85ok) - (EMP 89jk - EMP 85jk) / EMP 85jk) 
A higher  value of this growth variable suggests upward pressure on wages and would be positively 
correlated with the wage differential. 
 The sign on DDAYS is ambiguous among states with similar climates since the variation is 
relatively small among states within a region.  Across regions, if warmer climates are generally 
preferred, we would expect that warmer states could support lower wages as the amenity is 
capitalized in wages.  ED represents an investment in human capital and all else held equal, we 
would expect to see higher wages in regions with higher investment.  The occupational and 
industry dummies are an attempt to capture general variations in wages within occupation 
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categories that are missing in the remaining variables.  MHOUSE is used as a cost of living 
measure and it is expected to be positively correlated with wage differentials. 
 The migration equation (equation (4)) is estimated as a probit equation where the 
probability of a move is a function of the predicted wage differential for each of the choices (again-
-someone from the Northeast will have three predicted differentials, one each for the difference 
between the home state and New York, New Jersey and Florida, other regions have four choices 
each), migration propensity variables (AGE--age, TENURE--housing tenure in the origin state, 
KIDS--number of children, MARS--marital status, SPWORK--dummy variable for employed 
spouse), probability of finding employment (EMP--employment concentration differential one for 
each origin-destination choice), and a control for an individual’s relative earnings in their home 
state (WDIF).    
 Employment in an industry relative to total employment is used as a proxy for the 
probability of obtaining employment.  As this is measured relative to the origin employment 
concentration for a particular industry, a low ratio suggests a strong labor market for that industry 
in the destination relative to the origin.  EMP  is calculated as: 
 (EMP ok / TEMP o) - (EMP jk / TEMP j) 
where EMP ok is employment in industry k in the origin state and TEMP o  is total employment in  
the origin state and EMP jk is employment in industry k in alternative state j and TEMPj is total 
employment  in alternative state j.  
 The dependent variable in equation (4) is the dichotomous variable move (=1) or no move 
(=0).  The predicted value of the wage differential is used in the estimation of equation (4), and 
should be negatively correlated with the probability of a move.  However, if there is significant 
capitalization of fiscal and non-fiscal amenities, these nominal differentials will not matter as much 
in the migration decision as if no capitalization were present.  It is expected that the greater the 
capitalization of the state income and other taxes into wages, the less significance the predicted 
nominal wage differential will have in explaining the move decision. 
 In equation (4) personal characteristics are considered important determinants of the 
migration decision.  AGE, TENURE, MARS, KIDS are all entered to reflect costs associated with 
a move.  The relationship between moving and age is expected to be negative as found in Boehm, 
Herzog and Schlottmann (1991).  This is due to an increased cost of leaving an area due to personal 
and profession ties to the origin state.  Housing tenure is expected to negatively influence 
migration, again due to the increased costs of leaving an owner-occupied house.  The marital status 
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of the head of the household and number of children may also influence the ties to a given location 
as well.   Finally, WDIF is included to capture wage variations that an individual  receives in their 
home state.  The larger the individual's wage relative to the average for their industry and 
occupation, the lower probability that they will move. 
 
V.  Results 
  The results of the migration and the income differential equations are presented in Tables 2 
and 3.  For each region, the names of the choice states are listed in the column headings.  If we 
look first at the migration equations (Table 2), it is obvious that income differentials by themselves 
are not the driving factors in individual-level migration, much as has been found in the aggregate 
studies of Graves (1980) and Graves and Linneman (1979).  Some earlier studies tended to find 
that the income differential variables were the “wrong” sign (positive) in many cases suggesting 
that higher wages in the origin state increased the probability of migration.  In this study, we find a 
significant positive wage differential coefficient in only one case. There is also only one significant 
negative coefficient as well--that of individuals in the Southeast that look to Florida as a possible 
destination state. 
 The influence of the likelihood of getting a job (EMPj) is a significant predictor of 
migration in some cases.  For potential migrants from the Northeast, the relative strength of home 
job opportunities relative to New Jersey has a negative affect on the probability of migration.  In 
the Southeast, a similar story holds for those considering Florida as well as for those in the 
Midwest.  There is one positive EMP coefficient--for individuals in the Midwest looking at the 
possibility of a move to Illinois--which is contrary to expectations. Given the data in Table 2, it is 
hard not to conclude the personal characteristics of age and housing tenure are important forces in 
the migration decision in their own right, and the signs of these variables are as expected.   
 The wage differential equations give some insight into the potential reasons for the 
apparent insignificance of the wage differentials in the migration decision, and they also point out 
the importance of the state income tax among other variables in the migration decision.  The data in 
Table 3 present the coefficient estimates of the wage differential equations.  The income tax in 
particular shows a strong positive effect on wage differentials among the choice sets, particularly in 
the Northeast and West origin regions.  To the extent that the income tax is capitalized, we would 
not expect to see migration highly affected by the tax rate.   
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TABLE 2.  PROBABILITY OF MOVING (STANDARD ERRORS)14 
 
 
 
 
Independen
t Variable 
 
Northeast 
Choice Set: 
1- New 
York 
2 - New 
Jersey 
3 - Florida 
Southeast 
Choice Set: 
1 - DC 
2 - North 
Carolina 
3 - South 
Carolina 
4 - Florida 
West 
Choice Set: 
1 - Idaho 
2 - New 
Mexico 
3 - Nevada 
4 - Alaska 
Midwest 
Choice 
Set: 
1 - Ohio 
2 - Illinois 
3 - 
Michigan 
4 - Florida 
Intercept 
 
AGE 
 
TENURE 
 
KIDS 
 
MARS 
 
SPWORK 
 
WAGE1H 
 
WAGE2H 
 
WAGE3H 
 
WAGE4H 
 
EMP1    
 
EMP2    
 
EMP3 
 
EMP4 
 
WDIF 
 
Log-
likelihood 
-0.788 * 
(0.23) 
-0.019 * 
(0.002) 
-0.329 * 
(0.07) 
-0.057 
(0.03) 
-0.131 
(0.16) 
0.065 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(0.02) 
0.032 * 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.13) 
 NA 
 
-0.433 
(0.84) 
-1.704 * 
(0.76) 
0.002 
(0.43) 
 NA 
 
0.027 
(0.05) 
-934.60 
-0.73 * 
(0.25) 
-0.015 * 
(0.003) 
-0.521 * 
(0.07) 
-0.068 
(0.04) 
-0.090 
(0.18) 
0.059 
(0.07) 
0.237 
(0.62) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
-0.032 * 
(0.016) 
-0.353 
(0.51) 
1.912 
(1.32) 
-0.114 
(1.33) 
-1.649 * 
(0.78) 
0.017 
(0.06) 
-877.59 
-0.389 
(0.27) 
-0.009 * 
(0.003) 
-0.669 * 
(0.087) 
-0.108 * 
(0.034) 
-0.21 
(0.20) 
0.186 * 
(0.083) 
0.015 
(0.03) 
-0.026 
(0.03) 
0.043  
(0.03) 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
1.38 
(1.27) 
-0.974 
(0.98) 
-0.203 
(0.39) 
0.735  
(0.68) 
 0.032 
(0.023) 
-691.95 
-1.611 * 
(0.38) 
-0.017 * 
(0.002) 
-0.645 * 
(0.07) 
-0.145 
(0.087) 
0.543 
(.034) 
 0.215 * 
(0.07) 
-0.399 
(0.31) 
-0.015 
(0.03) 
-0.043 
(0.03) 
0.042 
(0.04) 
-3.116 
(2.11) 
3.706 * 
(1.60) 
-0.791 
(0.95) 
-1.399 * 
(0.47) 
0.003 
(.04) 
-1044.71 
 
                                                 
14 Standard errors were estimated using a bootstrap technique. 
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TABLE 3.  WAGE DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS: WAGE IN ORIGIN - WAGE IN POTENTIAL 
DESTINATION (STANDARD ERRORS) 
 
REGION 1: NORTHEAST 
Independent  
Variable 
Choice 1:  
New York 
Choice 2:  
New Jersey 
Choice 3:  
Florida 
Intercept 
 
SMTAX 
 
EMPGRO     
 
EXPED  
 
EXPWEL       
 
PTAX      
 
SALTAX     
 
DDAYS 
 
ED 
 
MHOUSE 
 
IND1 
 
IND2 
 
IND3 
 
IND4 
 
OC1 
 
OC2 
 
OC3 
 
R-sq 
-2.01 * 
(0.21) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
10.41 * 
(1.36) 
 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.005 * 
(0.001) 
18.17 
(23.17) 
-1.72 
(15.41) 
0.25 * 
(0.07) 
0.007 
(0.016) 
-0.0003 
(0.003) 
1.74 * 
(0.58) 
2.35 * 
(0.27) 
1.84 * 
(0.18) 
2.34 * 
(0.18) 
1.35 * 
(0.19) 
1.31 * 
(0.20) 
-1.54 * 
(0.17) 
0.10 
-0.85 * 
(0.23) 
0.05 * 
(0.02) 
1.61 
(1.37) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 * 
(0.001) 
-8.13 
(24.90) 
-10.01 
(15.79) 
0.137 * 
(0.07) 
0.007 
(0.02) 
0.0003 
(.0003) 
1.50 * 
(0.59) 
1.43 * 
(0.27) 
0.88 * 
(0.18) 
1.56 * 
(0.19) 
0.89 * 
(0.17) 
1.03 * 
(0.16) 
-1.29 * 
(0.27) 
0.07 
5.05 * 
(1.52) 
0.07 * 
(0.02) 
5.01 * 
(0.93) 
.0009  
(0.001) 
-0.0007 
(0.007) 
-3.35 
(24.50) 
-25.65 
(15.98) 
0.25 * 
(0.076) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.016 
(0.61) 
1.75 * 
(0.30) 
0.98 * 
(0.18) 
1.46 * 
(0.18) 
2.67 * 
(0.20) 
1.37 * 
(0.18) 
-0.45  
(0.27) 
0.09 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
 
REGION 2: SOUTHEAST 
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Independent 
Variable 
Choice 1: 
District of 
Columbia 
Choice 2:  
North 
Carolina 
Choice 3:  
South 
Carolina 
 
Choice 3: 
Florida 
Intercept 
 
SMTAX 
 
EMPGRO     
 
EXPED  
 
EXPWEL       
 
PTAX      
 
SALTAX     
 
DDAYS 
 
ED 
 
MHOUSE 
 
IND1 
 
IND2 
 
IND3 
 
IND4 
 
OC1 
 
OC2 
 
OC3 
 
R-sq 
-0.023 
(0.04) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.082 
(0.08) 
0.000 
(.02) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
1.424 
(3.74) 
4.372 
(3.81) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.0005 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.065 
(0.04) 
0.033 
(0.03) 
.044 * 
(0.02) 
0.019 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.02) 
0.010 
(0.01) 
-0.018 
(0.02) 
0.02 
4.030 * 
(0.36) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
8.809 * 
(1.06) 
-0.007 
(0.003)  
0.001 
(0.002) 
-3.708 
(3.65) 
5.449 
(6.69) 
-0.024 
(0.10) 
0.019 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-2.126 * 
(0.51) 
-1.612 * 
(0.30) 
-1.947 * 
(0.22) 
-3.302 * 
(0.20) 
-0.226 
(0.22) 
3.489 * 
(0.20) 
0.572 * 
(0.27) 
0.12 
3.915 * 
(0.40) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
11.070 * 
(1.21) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-7.12 
(4.55) 
7.21 
(5.74) 
-0.188 * 
(0.09) 
-0.010 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-2.067 * 
(0.62) 
-2.265 * 
(0.37) 
-2.322 * 
(0.27) 
-2.348 * 
(0.24) 
0.455 
(0.27) 
3.267 * 
(0.26) 
0.900 * 
(0.33) 
0.08 
2.280 
(1.95)  
0.004 
(0.01) 
10.403 * 
(1.05) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-6.439 
(5.89) 
10.288 
(6.71) 
-0.132 * 
(0.05) 
0.0047 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.51) 
-3.439 * 
(0.34) 
-3.266 * 
(0.24) 
-2.427 * 
(0.20) 
-3.625 * 
(0.22) 
-0.117 
(0.22) 
3.584 * 
(0.21) 
0.334 
(0.27) 
0.13 
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
 
REGION 3: WEST 
Independent 
Variable 
Choice 1:  
Idaho 
Choice 2:  
New Mexico 
Choice 3:  
Nevada 
Choice 4:  
Alaska 
Intercept 
 
SMTAX 
 
EMPGRO     
 
EXPED 
 
EXPWEL       
 
PTAX    
 
SALTAX     
 
DDAYS 
 
ED 
 
MHOUSE 
 
IND1 
 
IND2 
 
IND3 
 
IND4 
 
OC1 
 
OC2 
 
OC3 
 
R-sq 
6.403 * 
(2.48) 
0.020 * 
(0.007) 
-0.084 
(0.15) 
0.006 * 
(0.002) 
0.006 * 
(0.003) 
-4.55 * 
(1.96) 
-0.879 
(0.57) 
0.037 * 
(-0.012) 
-0.011 * 
(0.003) 
-0.002 * 
(0.001) 
-2.31 * 
(0.27) 
0.779 * 
(0.19) 
1.973 * 
(0.13) 
-0.627 * 
(0.14) 
1.631 * 
(0.14) 
-1.39 * 
(0.12) 
0.517 * 
(0.15) 
0.22 
4.611 
(3.53)  
0.035 * 
(0.008) 
-0.208 
(0.16) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-1.601 
(1.01) 
-0.940 
(1.03) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.013 * 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.243  
(0.29) 
0.767 * 
(0.21) 
3.827 * 
(0.14) 
0.688 * 
(0.14) 
1.810 * 
(0.15) 
-1.745 * 
(0.13) 
0.640 * 
(0.17) 
0.28  
5.356 
(3.29) 
0.037 * 
(0.01) 
0.266 * 
(0.22)  
0.012 * 
(0.004) 
0.009 * 
(0.004) 
-6.492 * 
(2.61) 
-1.892 
(1.16) 
0.047 * 
(0.017) 
-0.016 * 
(0.006) 
-0.004 * 
(0.003) 
-1.398 * 
(0.41) 
-1.110 * 
(0.31) 
4.408 * 
(0.20) 
0.392 * 
(0.19) 
1.888 * 
(0.22) 
-1.084 * 
(0.18) 
-0.645 * 
(0.22) 
0.22 
-2.40 
(6.64) 
0.038 * 
(0.007) 
-0.321 * 
(0.13) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.535 
(3.81) 
0.044 
(0.12) 
-0.009 
(0.01) 
-0.006 * 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.874 * 
(0.26) 
0.706 * 
(0.19) 
2.654 * 
(0.13) 
0.611 * 
(0.12) 
 -1.964 * 
(0.13) 
-1.711 * 
(0.11) 
-1.492 * 
(0.14) 
0.21 
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
 
REGION 4: MIDWEST 
Independent 
Variable 
Choice 1:  
Ohio 
Choice 2:  
Illinois 
Choice 3:  
Michigan 
Choice 4: 
Florida 
Intercept 
 
SMTAX 
 
EMPGRO     
 
EXPED 
 
EXPWEL       
 
PTAX      
 
SALTAX     
 
DDAYS 
 
ED 
 
MHOUSE 
 
IND1 
 
IND2 
 
IND3 
 
IND4 
 
OC1 
 
OC2 
 
OC3  
 
R-sq 
0.228 
(-0.18) 
-0.0005 
(0.003) 
0.022 
(0.11) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
4.221 
(3.00) 
2.452 
(5.72) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.020 
(0.05) 
0.023 
(0.04) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
-0.019 
(0.02) 
0.017 
(0.03) 
-0.010 
(0.02) 
0.056 * 
(0.03) 
0.02 
-0.342 * 
(0.15) 
-0.028 
(0.08)  
-1.422 * 
(0.35) 
0.002 * 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.694 
(9.21) 
-1.300 
(14.98) 
0.054 * 
(0.02) 
-0.012 
(0.01) 
0.0009 
(0.001) 
0.573 * 
(0.14) 
-0.001 
(0.12) 
0.708 * 
(0.07) 
0.718 * 
(0.07) 
-1.291 * 
(0.08) 
-1.718 * 
(0.06) 
-0.666 * 
(0.10) 
0.12 
-1.745 * 
(0.71) 
-0.0003 
(0.008) 
-0.954 * 
(0.42) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
12.806 
(10.49) 
15.406 
(14.16) 
0.019 
(0.02) 
-0.007 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.16) 
0.437 * 
(0.14) 
1.156 * 
(0.14) 
0.823 * 
(0.09) 
1.409 * 
(0.85) 
-1.557 * 
(0.89) 
-0.064 
(0.07) 
-1.416 * 
(0.12) 
0.12 
0.010 
(0.42) 
0.021 * 
(0.01) 
-3.298 * 
(0.39) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
14.231 
(9.92) 
0.277 
(14.70) 
0.023 
(0.02) 
0.010 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.027 
(0.16) 
1.398 * 
(0.14) 
1.306 * 
(0.09) 
0.580 * 
(0.08) 
 0.349 * 
(0.08) 
-0.374 * 
(0.07) 
0.541 * 
(0.11) 
0.06 
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 In cases where the state personal income tax differential is significant, the tax accounts for 
between 5 and 40 percent of the wage differential across states.   The income tax is capitalized into 
wages most in the Northeast and West regions relative to the choice states.  For the West  sample, 
there is evidence of a negative capitalization of property tax rates, which is contrary to 
expectations.  This may be due in part to the influence of outliers like California where property tax 
limitations may have affected the relative property tax rate, relative to the other states.  The results 
suggest little support for the capitalization hypothesis for property and sales taxes which may be 
due to the more local nature of property and sales taxes.  Weather is important (and of opposite 
sign) in the Northeastern’s wage differential and in Southeastern’s wage differential.  In the West, 
the expenditure variables, per capita education and welfare, are both positively reflected in wage 
differentials. 
 The employment market characteristics of states perform largely as expected, with one 
exception.  EMPGRO (the growth in employment in the potential migrants industry in the home 
versus destination states) leads to increased wage differentials in the Northeast and Southeast 
comparisons (as expected), but is not important when looking at the West potential migrant group.  
However, in the Midwest region, EMPGRO is negatively correlated with wage differentials.  One 
explanation is that the growth in the industry has increased labor supply enough to dampen the 
price of such labor relative to that in other states.  The combination of the labor market variables 
shows that in general, growth in employment is accompanied by higher wages.  
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 The motivation of this paper was to identify the effect of state personal income taxes on the 
state-to-state migration decisions.  The basic investment model of migration can be used to 
investigate whether taxes play a role in the migration decision, but if taxes are capitalized into 
wage differentials, tax variables may not be significant in migration decisions.  Previous studies 
fail to find consistent significant impacts of state income taxes on migration.  Using individual 
level data, we imputed expected wages to individuals based on their origin and potential 
destination states.  Using this information, we calculated effective state income tax rates using a 
simulation model of state income tax structures.  We find that in a number of cases, income tax 
differentials are reflected in wages.  This capitalization would explain why state income tax 
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variables themselves do not explain migration in previous studies.  The capitalization may also 
reduce the significance of the resulting wage differentials on a state-to-state level.   
 We do not find support for the capitalization of other fiscal variables which may be due to 
the fact that sales and property taxes are more difficult to capitalize as they are not as specific to 
each individual as state income taxes are (due to graduated rate structures and the types of 
exemptions and deductions allowed by states).  This line of inquiry could be extended to 
incorporate both the state income tax and local tax variables using a data set which reports city-to-
city (or metro area) migration.  A more detailed calculation of applicable tax variables and use of 
the capitalization hypothesis would allow us to analyze the effects of state and local variables on 
the migration decision more definitively. 
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RECENT PUBLICATIONS 
(All publications listed are available at http://frp.aysps.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Program 
at 404/651-2782, or fax us at 404/651-2737. ) 
• The Effect of State Income Tax Structure on Interstate Migration. (Sally Wallace). This 
report analyzes the effect of state income taxes on individual migration among states. FRP 
Report/Brief 79 (December 2002) 
• Georgia’s Corporate Income and Net Worth Taxes. (Martin F. Grace). This report 
examines the Georgia Corporate Income tax and Net Worth Tax and examines some 
possible reforms. FRP Report/Brief 78 (December 2002) 
• Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994-2001: Trends, Causes and Impact on 
Teacher Quality. (Catherine Freeman, Benjamin Scafidi and David L. Sjoquist). This report 
looks at recent trends in segregation and its impact on teacher quality in the state of 
Georgia. FRP Report/Brief 77 (November 2002) 
• Job Creation by Georgia Start-Up Businesses. (Lakshmi Pandey and Jeanie Thomas). This 
report examines the success rate of start-up companies in Georgia by industry and by 
region between 1986 and 2000. FRP Report 76 (November 2002) 
• Local Tax Base Sharing: An Incentive for Intergovernmental Cooperation. (Geoffrey 
Turnbull). This report develops and explains the principles for designing effective tax base 
sharing among local governments as a means of coordinating development incentives. FRP 
Report/Brief 75 (October 2002) 
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• Firm-Level Effects of Apportionment Formula Changes. (Kelly D. Edmiston and F. Javier 
Arze). This report utilizes Georgia corporate income tax returns from 1992 - 1998 to 
examine the effects of its 1995 change in apportionment formula on the levels of sales, 
payroll, and property in the state. FRP Report/Brief 74 (October 2002) 
• Local Land Use Policy and Investment Incentives. (Geoffrey Turnbull). This report 
discusses how the treat of land use regulation affects the pace and pattern of urban 
development and how legal constraints on policy makers can alter the intended effects of 
land use controls. FRP Report 73 (June 2002) 
• Do Local Sales Taxes for Education Increase Inequities? The Case of Georgia’s ESPLOST. 
(Ross Rubenstein and Catherine Freeman). This report examines the equity effects of 
Georgia’s use of the Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax for Education (ESPLOST). 
FRP Report/Brief 72 (June 2002) 
• The Net Economic Impact of Large Firm Openings and Closures in the State of Georgia. 
(Kelly D. Edmiston). This report estimates the net employment impact of large firm 
locations and closures in the State of Georgia. New high technology firms are found to 
generate considerably more spillover employment than non-high-tech firm openings, and 
the spillovers are greater the more narrowly high technology is defined. FRP Report/Brief 
71 (May 2002) 
• How Much Preference: Effective Personal Income Tax Rates for the Elderly. (Barbara 
Edwards and Sally Wallace). This report analyzes the effect of differential income tax 
treatment of the elderly in Georgia and in the U.S. FRP Report/Brief 70 (April 2002) 
• Residential Mobility, Migration and Georgia’s Labor Force. (Amy Helling and Nevbahar 
Ertas). This report examines the characteristics of workers who recently moved into and 
within Georgia and focuses particularly on who is employed in newly created jobs. FRP 
Report/Brief 69 (February 2002) 
• Revenue Implications for Georgia of Tax Changes Since 1987. (Kelly Edmiston, Alan 
Essig, Catherine Freeman, et al.). This report provides estimates of the state revenue 
impacts of all tax changes since 1987. FRP Report 68 (January 2002) 
• Georgia’s Taxes: A Summary of Major State and Local Government Taxes, 8th Edition. 
(Jack Morton and Richard Hawkins). A handbook on taxation that provides a quick 
overview of all state and local taxes in Georgia. FRP Annual Publication A(8) (January 
2002) 
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• Does Growth Pay For Itself? Property Tax Trends for School Systems in Georgia. (Richard 
R. Hawkins). This report examines the relationship between economic growth and Georgia 
school property tax bases. FRP Report/Brief 67 (January 2002) 
• Are Small Urban Centers Magnets for Economic Growth? (Benjamin Scafidi, William J. 
Smith, and Mary Beth Walker). This report estimates a model of county-level job growth 
and finds an effect of small urban centers on their regional economies. FRP Report/Brief 66 
(December 2001) 
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